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Banking Structure in the West 
Banking is more decentralized in the U.S. 
than in any other developed country because 
of  restrictions on interstate branch i  ng and the 
power of states to make their own banking 
laws. Such a combination can influence mar-
ket structure and the level of competition in 
banking which in turn affect prices, profits, 
and offerings of financial services. 
The nine western states of Alaska, Arizona, 
California, Hawaii, Idaho, Nevada, Oregon, 
Utah, and Washington, make up the Federal 
Reserve System' 5  12th District. These western 
states, in general, have not embraced 
extremely. restrictive banking laws. They also 
share the experience of rapid economic 
growth. Combined, these legislative' and 
economic characteristics have given these 
states distinctive banking structures. A com-
parison of  their banking structure with that of 
the rest of  the country therefore might shed 
light on the effects of current legislative and 
economic changes on the national banking 
structure. 
Branching: u.s. versus the West 
A major difference between banking laws in 
the West and those in the United States histor-
ically has been the extentto which branching 
was permitted. In about a quarter of the fifty 
states, only un·it banks (banks with one full 
service office) were allowed in 1980. About 
the same number of states limited the maxi-
mum distance bank branches could locate 
from their main office. The remaining states, 
including all the western states, permitted 
some form of statewide branching. 
The few branching limitations thatdid exist in 
the last decade in some western states could 
be circumvented, albeit at a cost, through the 
formation of bank holding companies. These 
companies geographically expanded by 
acquiring or establishing banks in other 
areas. In Utah and Oregon, for example, 
where de novo (new) bank formation is not 
restricted, bank holding companies used that 
method to circumvent restrictions on branch-
ing outside a bank's home office area. As a 
result, these states have large numbersof 
multi-bank holding companies. In fact, while 
the average state percentage of deposits held 
by multi-bank holding companies in 1980 
was 33 percent in the West as a whole, itwas 
67 percent in Utah and 80 percent in Oregon. 
In Washington, there historically have been 
restrictions on bank holding company forma-
tion as well as on branching, although 
branch-swapping has allowed some banks to 
enter each other's territories. 
Such methods of circumventing branching 
restrictions prevail in restrictive states outside 
the 12th District as well. On average, how-
ever, the restrictions elsewhere appear to 
have been more effective than they were in 
the West. Banking organizations operated an 
average of 3.8 offices in 1980 in the U.5. as a 
whole; they operated an average of 12.7 in 
the West in the same year. 
Western economic growth 
Throughout its history, the West has also 
been distinguished by rapid economic 
growth. In the last decade alone, its popula-
tion surged 23 percent and its personal 
income jumped 66 percent. The respective 
growth rates for the U.S. were only 11 and 48 
percent. Such rapid growth has probably 
contributed to the continued permissive 
western attitudes toward new bank entry and 
branching as both present less of a perceived 
threat to established organizations in good 
economic times. 
Liberal regulations resulting from this en-
vironment in the West have not led to the 
inefficient, grossly concentrated markets 
feared by some opponents of national finan-
cial market.deregulation. Instead, the com-
bined evidence from western patterns in new 
bank entry, branching services, deposit 
shares, and non-bank competition suggest 
little that is consistent with this view. 
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New bank entry 
During the last decade, the formation of new 
banks has led to only a slight (7 percent) 
increase in the total number of banks in the 
u.s. (after taking account of all mergers and 
acquisitions). In contrast, the number of 
Western banks increased at a much faster 
rate, from 421  to 817 -a  94-percent jump. 
The faster growth trend in the 12th District 
appears to contradict the notion that entry of 
new banks will be stifled in states where the 
expansion of existing banks can be achieved 
through branching. Although it is true that 
new entry was greater in percentage terms in 
the more restrictive branching states of Utah, 
Washington, and Oregon than in the liberal 
branching states, there has been active for-
eign and domestic de novo entry throughout 
the District. Over 200 new banks have 
opened for business in California in the last 
decade, for example. 
Branching services 
Another distinctive feature of western bank-
ing concerns the prevalence of branching 
services. It is commonly argued that there are 
economies of scale in providing branch ser-
vices and that restrictive branching laws 
restrain the exploitation of such economies. 
Thus, one would expect states with liberal 
branching laws to have more bank branches 
per capita than other states. Western states, 
however, have lower branch-to-population 
ratios than other states. The number of 
branches per 100,000 people in the West is 
less than 21; in the U.S., it is 25. 
This apparent paradox can be explained by 
the high concentrations of population in 
urban areas in the West. Eighty-six percent of 
Westerners live within metropolitan areas, 
whereas only 74 percent do so nationwide. 
Individual western branches can, therefore, 
serve a greater number of customers. A com-
parison of branch-to-population ratios in 
states within the 12th District support this 
explanation. California, Nevada, Arizona, 
and Hawaii, all with very high percentages of 
the population living in metropolitan areas, 
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have lower branch-to-population ratios than 
Idaho and Alaska where the percentages of 
people living in metropolitan areas are small. 
Deposit share concentration 
The existence of some economies of scale in 
branch banking is more firmly corroborated 
by evidence on bank market shares in the 
West. If there were economies of scale in 
branch services, liberal branching regula-
tions should be associated with higher con-
centrations of deposit shares per banking 
organization because they permit banks to 
reach larger, and presumably more efficient, 
scales. For example, the share of  deposits 
owned by the top three banks in each of the 
Western states in 1980 was 70 percent on 
average, while the share for aliSO states was 
only 42 percent. 
State concentration ratios within the West 
also tended to vary inversely with the degree 
of branching restriction. The more restrictive 
states of Utah, Washington, and Oregon had 
the lowest three-bank concentration ratios in 
the West of 60, 58, and 62 percent in 1980, 
respectively. This suggests that the removal of 
branching restrictions would indeed lead to 
greater shares of  deposits held by large banks 
and raises the issue of the consequences of 
such increased concentration for the effec-
tiveness of competition'. However, the effect 
of liberal banking laws on effective competi-
tion is more complex than the preceding 
comparisons suggest. 
Effective competition 
First,  the  usual  measure of concentration-
the deposit share held by the top few banks-
may not reflect adequately the effective level 
of competition. This is because it does not 
'distinguish between the case where a few 
large banks exist without any small-bank 
rivalry and the case in which there are numer-
ous small rivals. A more complex index, the 
Herfindahl index, attempts to distinguish 
between such cases on the grounds that even 
a small bank can be an effective actual or 
potential threat to a large institution. Using 
such a measure, the liberal branching states Change(%) 
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of the West differ little in competitiveness 
from their less liberal counterparts. Indeed, 
California, a liberal branching state, has been 
as "competitive" as its traditionally more 
restrictive counterparts-Oregon, Utah, and 
Washington. 
Second, state-level concentration measures 
may be less relevant to the assessment of 
effective competition than the concentration 
levels at the local level, where much of the 
rivalry for consumer and small business cus-
tomers takes place. There is mixed evidence 
for this observation in the Twelfth District. In 
1981, banks in California and Arizona (two 
"liberal" branching states) actually faced 
lower concentrations of bank power (by the 
Herfindahl measure) in metropolitan areas 
than banks in the more restrictive state of 
Oregon. Although such comparisons do not 
hold consistently throughout the District, 
such a result would not be unexpected when 
branching is limited to the county or metro-
politan area in which the head office is 
located. Such a restriction limits the num-
ber of potential entrants from outside the 
market and may limit the effectiveness of 
branching restrictions in preserving effective 
competition. 
Moreover, as an adjunct to liberal branching 
laws, the West has encouraged non-bank and 
foreign bank competition, further promoting 
vigorous competition in financial markets. 
The strength of  non-bank competition may be 
responsible for the smaller share of total 
financial institution deposits held by banks in 
the West compared to banks in the U.S. 
Whereas banks nationwide owned 68 per-
cent of all depository institutions' assets in 
1980, banks in the West could claim only 61 
percent. 
Foreign banks have also been aggressive in 
Western banking through branch bank net-
works and active agency and representative 
offices. Although 95 of the 130 major foreign 
banks in the u.S. in 1981  had established 
New York as their home state,  11  others 
chose western locations. These, too, provide 
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effective and sophisticated competition for 
the domestic banks. 
Implications 
An evaluation of  the western banking experi-
ence provides several possible (although 
ambiguous) lessons for national banking 
policy. First, although liberalizing branching 
restrictions (on a state-by-state or national 
basis) would very likely raise national and 
state deposit share concentration levels, by 
some measu res effective competition at the 
local market level may not be severely com-
promised. (In addition, there appear to be 
economies of scale in banking that might 
otherwise go unexploited.) Evidence for this 
conclusion lies in the poor correlation 
between state and metropolitan levels of 
concentration in the West. The poor correla-
tion reswlts because as banks expand their 
branching networks outside their home terri-
tory, they face more metropolitan competi-
tors. National statistics already reflect this 
situation. While the state market shClre of the 
top five banks in the fifty states has increased 
only 0.1  percent on average in the last 
decade, the average metropol itan share of  the 
top five banks has fallen between 3 and 7 
percent in every state. 
Second, we can find no evidence that the 
entry of new banks is foreclosed by liberal 
branching legislation. Throughout the West, 
there has been active entry of new, small 
banks even in those states where such entry is 
not simply a vehicle to circumvent branching 
restrictions. 
Finally, non-bank depository institutions 
have shown themselves to be effective 
market participants in the West, even in the 
earlier decade when their deposit taking and 
lending activities were more constrained 
than they are today. On balance, further 
liberalization of branching, and asset and 
deposit-taking powers seems unlikely, there-
fore, to lead to overly concentrated banking 
markets and the poor quality banking ser-
vices many fear. 
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BANKING DATA-TWELfTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT 
(Do!lar amounts.in millions) 
Selected Assets and Liabilities 
large Commercial Banks 
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total# 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate 
Loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
U.s. Treasury securities* 
Other securities* 
Demand deposits - total # 
Demand deposits - adjusted 
Savings deposits - total 
Time deposits ~  total # 
Individuals, part. & corp. 
(Large negotiable CD's) 
Weekly Averages 
of Daily Figures 
Member Bank Reserve Position 
Excess Reserves (  + )/Deficiency (-) 
Borrowings 
Net free reserves (+  )/Net borrowed( - ) 
* Excludes trading account securities. 






























+  21 
30 
+  30 
- 100 
+3,433 
+  654 
+  824 
+  406 
+  337 
+  121 
Change from 
year ago 
Dollar  Percent 
+  8,304  5.3 
+  9,603  7.2 
+  5,316  13.2 
+  2,431  4.4 
+  102  .4 
+  441  24.0 
+  1,061  19.0 
2,360  - 15.4 
+  789  1.9 
+  445  1.6 
+  2,726  9.1 
+  15,295  18.0 
+  12,920  16.7 
+  5,051  15.5 
Weekended  Comparable 
10/27/82  year-ago period 
123  62 
3  50 
120  12 
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